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Russian COLD RELIC hackers used stolen Google Workspace data to breach second US organisation

By The Daily Byte ·18 Nov 2026 ·4 min read
Google headquarters building in Mountain View, California, with the Google logo on its glass facade
Russian hackers turned one organisation's stolen cloud data into a weapon against a second target, Google's Mandiant and Threat Intelligence Group said in a case study published on 17 November 2026. The group, known as COLD RELIC, first broke into a US organisation's Google Workspace environment in late 2025, stole its staff directory and cloud files, and then used that material to impersonate its employees and breach a second US organisation in 2026. Neither organisation has been named. Google said it observed fresh phishing activity from the group as recently as November 2026. COLD RELIC was previously tracked as COLDRIVER and UNC4057, and is also known as Callisto, Star Blizzard and Gossamer Bear. The US Justice Department has assessed that Callisto operates inside Centre 18 of Russia's Federal Security Service, the FSB. Google has tracked the group since 2015. ## How the first organisation was breached The first intrusion began in late 2025, when the hackers obtained the credentials of a Google Workspace Super Admin account. Initial access came through a residential proxy network close to the victim's location, and the attackers combined the stolen credentials with a multi-factor authentication (MFA) push-fatigue attack, in which the victim is bombarded with approval requests until one is accepted. With Super Admin privileges, the group downloaded the contents of the organisation's entire cloud storage drive, both by downloading files directly and by mass-sharing them to an attacker-controlled email account. The hackers also exported the staff directory, started a tenant-wide Google Takeout export, and queried security and email audit logs to check how visible they were, viewing, modifying and deleting Alert Center notifications to remove evidence of the intrusion. To stay in, the attackers registered their own device in the tenant and enrolled passkeys and MFA backup codes as alternative ways back in. Google said the group kept access for several months, syncing email inboxes through OAuth to external clients and re-authenticating with attacker-enrolled passkeys that survived password and session resets. A password change alone did not remove them. ## From stolen data to a second victim Even after the attackers were removed from the first organisation, Google observed them using email accounts impersonating its employees to target its staff and professional contacts. The second phase began when the group contacted a person at a second US organisation over a secure messaging app, posing as an employee of the first victim, and shared phishing links designed to harvest Microsoft Entra ID credentials and authentication tokens under the pretext of sharing a document about a technical issue. The second organisation used Microsoft Entra ID as its federated single sign-on provider for Google Workspace. Once the stolen credentials worked, the attackers registered and used a new MFA device in the single sign-on system to keep access to the user account, then bulk-downloaded the files available in that user's cloud drive. The scope was narrower than the first breach: Mandiant reported theft of files available to the compromised user, not a company-wide export. After compromising the second organisation, the messaging app account used to start the conversation had its profile name changed to a different persona, which Google suspects was likely used to target other organisations in the same professional network. ## Why this case matters Google did not identify a malware payload in either breach. The attack relied instead on stolen credentials, abused cloud privileges and social engineering. By impersonating someone known in the same professional circles as the new target, the attackers increased their chance of phishing success. "Cold Relic's campaigns demonstrate the convergence of human-centric social engineering and cloud identity abuse," Google said. "By obtaining access to strategic personnel rosters and operational documents, Russian intelligence services turn legitimate business communications into attack vectors against trusted partners." The group has previously been linked to the LOSTKEYS document-theft malware in a separate 2025 campaign, but Google's new report does not tie that malware to either intrusion described here. The lesson is that a cloud compromise does not end when the attacker is evicted: stolen directories and identities can be reused for months, and recovery must include checking for attacker-enrolled passkeys and MFA devices, not just resetting passwords. ## Frequently asked questions Who is COLD RELIC? A Russia-linked cyber espionage group formerly tracked as COLDRIVER and UNC4057, also known as Callisto and Star Blizzard. The US Justice Department has linked Callisto to Russia's FSB. How did the group breach the second organisation? By impersonating an employee of the first victim over a messaging app and sending phishing links that harvested Microsoft Entra ID credentials and tokens. Why did password resets not remove the attackers? Because they had enrolled their own passkeys and MFA backup codes, which survived password and session resets. Unauthorised authenticators must be removed and sessions revoked. Sources: The Hacker News (https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/russian-cold-relic-hackers-use-stolen.html) and CybersecurityNews (https://cybersecuritynews.com/russian-hackers-3/).