CVE-2026-74127: AMD PSP Boot Flaw Has No Fix

Google researchers have disclosed a critical flaw in the security processor built into AMD Zen 1 and Zen Plus chips that lets an attacker run unsigned code at the very start of boot, and AMD has confirmed there will be no fix. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-74127 and scored 9.4 out of 10, sits in the chip's read-only boot memory, so it can only be removed by building new hardware.
The flaw was found by Google security researcher Matteo Rizzo while he was testing whether the 2018 Masterkey bug, tracked as CVE-2018-8930, could still be used against AMD's Platform Security Processor, known as the PSP. He reported the new issue to AMD on 19 August 2026. AMD published its bulletin on 17 November, and full details with a working proof-of-concept exploit followed on 19 November. No attacks in the wild have been confirmed.
What the PSP is and why it matters
The PSP is a small Cortex-A5 management core embedded inside AMD processors. It is the first component to start when a machine powers on, running before the main x86 cores are released from reset, and it is responsible for checking and loading the system firmware. It holds full access to all of the system's memory, can take control of the main cores, and can read and write all RAM. Anything running on the PSP is invisible to the operating system and to software on the x86 cores, which is why a flaw there is rated critical even though it needs local access to exploit.
The vulnerability is a variant of Masterkey, the 2018 flaw in which AMD's firmware signature checks could be bypassed. The new bug lives in the PSP boot ROM, the immutable code burned into the chip that verifies the PSP bootloader stored in the system's SPI flash memory, where the BIOS lives. Because the boot ROM cannot be rewritten, AMD says it does not plan to release any mitigation for the issue.
How the bypass works
Google's researchers traced the flaw to three quirks in the boot ROM loader working together. First, if the main bootloader fails its RSA signature check, the boot ROM leaves the rejected code sitting in the processor's SRAM memory instead of clearing it. Second, the directory in the SPI flash that records which module is which type is not itself signed, so an attacker can rearrange it. Third, if a module header declares a signed size of zero, the boot ROM loads only the header and signature into memory.
An attacker who can write to the BIOS SPI flash from software, which needs no physical access to the machine, can use those quirks in sequence. They patch the main bootloader's body at memory address 0x100, then swap the recovery bootloader slot with a valid AMD-signed donor module that has a signed size of zero and a load address of 0x100. When the tampered main bootloader fails its check, the boot ROM loads the recovery slot, verifies the donor module's header signature, leaves the patched code at 0x100 untouched, and jumps to it. The result is unsigned code running on the PSP at the earliest stage of boot, with full platform privileges and persistence across reboots.
Who is affected and what to do
Google verified the flaw on a Ryzen 5 1600X, a Zen 1 chip, and a Ryzen 7 2700X, a Zen Plus chip. First-generation Zen 1 EPYC server chips are likely affected as well. Zen 2 and later processors are not affected, because no signed donor modules with a zero signed size exist for those generations, so the chain cannot be completed.
Because there is no patch, defence comes down to controlling who can write to the firmware. Organisations running Zen 1 or Zen Plus machines should restrict local administrator and kernel-level rights, and block unauthorised software writes to the BIOS SPI flash. A working Python proof-of-concept is now public, but no live exploitation has been reported, and the attack still needs that privileged write access to the flash chip before it can begin. For owners of affected hardware, the practical message is blunt: the flaw will not be fixed, so the machines that carry it need tighter controls around firmware access for the rest of their working lives.