Party Panel Android trojan rents fake bank apps in India

Security researchers have uncovered a rent-a-trojan service that lets fraudsters spin up fake Google Play pages and branded Android banking malware for Indian banks and card issuers in minutes. The operation, uncovered by threat intelligence firm CloudSEK and detailed in research published on 20 November, is the second such service aimed at Indian bank customers that the firm has exposed in a month.
The service is built around a multi-tenant malware-as-a-service panel the researchers call "Party Panel". A single unprotected server hosted the whole operation: 50 tenant accounts, 34 of them on paid licences of 7 to 60 days approved between 8 and 12 November 2026, targeting customers of six Indian banks and card issuers, along with users of government services. Lures and apps impersonating three of the six institutions were still live on 14 November.
A fake Play Store page that steals card details
The lure is a fake "
Once the card details are in, the page tells the victim in Hinglish that the "web portal is inactive" and walks them through installing a 4.4 MB APK. Each tenant, which the panel calls a "party", picks a brand, a page design, a card-data form and its own Telegram bot, and the panel then builds a branded Android app. Nineteen tenants went live on 10 November. Government-service themes such as traffic e-challans, a farmer income-support scheme and pensioners' life certificates widen the net to farmers, vehicle owners and pensioners.
A dropper that pretends to be the Play Store
The APK is a two-stage attack. The first stage, a dropper packaged as com.secure.android.manager, asks for only three permissions so it looks harmless at install. It decrypts a second app hidden in its own files and installs it while posing as the Play Store, so Android 13 and later treat it as a store install and skip the Restricted Settings protection, a technique documented as SecuriDropper in 2023. The dropper then switches off Google Play Protect's verifier and starts a local VPN that routes Play Store and Play Services traffic into a dead tunnel.
The second stage, com.userdb.customer, has no launcher icon and restarts on boot and power events. On commands delivered through Firebase Cloud Messaging, it forwards every incoming SMS, including bank one-time passwords, to the operators, uploads the SMS inbox and gallery photos, which often include card, Aadhaar and PAN images, sends texts from the victim's number, and sets call forwarding with the USSD code **21*<number>#, so the bank's verification calls ring the fraudster instead. Together with the card details from the fake page, CloudSEK says this gives the operator everything needed for card-not-present fraud.
The panel's API answered without a login, which is how the researchers could see all 50 tenants. Exfiltration runs through a Firebase project and 13 Telegram bots. CloudSEK assesses with medium confidence that the operator is based in India, citing Hinglish page text, the Asia/Kolkata time zone, Indian hosting and all-Indian targets, indicators it calls consistent but circumstantial. Victim records were referred to the affected institutions, CERT-In and I4C, India's cybercrime coordination centre.
What customers should do
CloudSEK's advice to bank customers is plain: install banking apps only from Google Play or the App Store by searching for the bank's name, check the developer name, and never install an APK sent by a link, SMS or WhatsApp message. A real Play Store page never asks for a card number or CVV. Anyone who installed one of these apps should dial ##002# to cancel all call forwarding, block the card through official channels, uninstall the app and report it at cybercrime.gov.in or by calling 1930.
For banks, the researchers say call-forwarding activation alongside new-device OTP use around card-not-present transactions is a strong signal of this trojan. Because the panel builds a fresh branded app in minutes, reporting the hosting, Firebase and Telegram abuse matters more than chasing any single lure URL. The setup was crude, a bare IP address with no domain or CDN in front of it, but that made it resilient: when the operator's one domain was suspended, the lure simply fell back to the IP and kept working.
Sources: CloudSEK; IntelFusions.