Qubole Named in Chase, Visa, Mastercard Data Leak

Qubole, a cloud data analytics company, has been named as the suspected vendor behind the data leak that exposed customer information from JPMorgan Chase, Visa and Mastercard. The link is unconfirmed, but it is the first time a specific company has been identified in connection with the breach, which all three financial firms acknowledged on 19 November.
The extortion group n0n claimed responsibility for an attack on Qubole on 11 November, according to BleepingComputer. The group says that between 14 and 26 October it used compromised Qubole credentials to reach customers’ Amazon Web Services environments through IAM roles, the permission settings those customers had configured to let Qubole work with their data.
Qubole is owned by Idera and provides cloud data analytics, automated processing, real-time analysis and reporting. BleepingComputer reports that the group claims to have stolen 53.9 GB across 30,743 files directly from Qubole, including customer contracts, pricing records, staff and trial-user information and production data. It also claims to hold nearly one petabyte of data from Qubole’s customer networks. None of those figures has been independently verified.
The group published data it said came from suppliers serving the three firms on its extortion site on 16 November. JPMorgan Chase then said in a post on X that third parties providing services to the firm had been targeted by a cyberattack, and that attackers had accessed marketing data that may include some customer names and email addresses. The bank said the incident did not disrupt its services and was unrelated to a service disruption earlier in the week, which it attributed to a software bug.
What the leaked files actually contain
Visa said the claims were associated with an incident at a third-party service provider in Asia Pacific, that its own systems were not involved, and that no payments data such as card numbers was affected. Mastercard said a provider incident exposed a limited number of email addresses, described as non-payments information, from a small subset of cardholders in one benefit programme, and that the exposure had been contained.
Researchers at SOCRadar, a threat intelligence firm that has tracked n0n since it emerged in September, parsed all 14 files in the group’s published Visa and Mastercard archives. They told The Register the files contain no card numbers, expiry dates, CVVs, passwords, dates of birth or home addresses, which matches Visa’s statement that no card numbers were affected.
What the files do contain, according to SOCRadar, is mobile numbers, Bank Identification Number prefixes, and dated airline, hotel and restaurant bookings. That detail is enough for fraud, the firm’s chief information security officer, Ensar Seker, warned: it is what a fraudster needs to pose as a concierge desk or a bank in an email or voice-phishing attack.
The published files are only a small part of what the group claims to hold, about 0.4 percent of it, or roughly 4.3 GB and 1.9 million marketing events, so a further release is possible, Seker said. Reuters reviewed the posted data and could not verify it, but reported that it contained more than 16,000 JPMorgan customer email addresses and about 124 bank employee addresses.
Why Qubole is suspected, and what is still unproven
The Qubole connection rests on timing and on a separate supply-chain campaign disclosed earlier in November by Wiz, working with Google’s Mandiant incident responders and AI data security company Sentra. In that campaign, attackers used compromised identity and access management credentials associated with Qubole’s AWS account to reach dozens of downstream customers’ environments, stealing secrets and other sensitive data from storage buckets.
SOCRadar’s analysis points the same way: both the Visa and Mastercard datasets use the same 27-column booking layout, placeholder text and customer-relationship-management ID format, and the most recent record in each stops 69 seconds apart on 26 October. Seker described the pattern as two card programmes run on one provider’s platform, and a batch copy from a marketing and reporting store.
Even so, the Qubole link remains an assessment, not a confirmed finding. Seker told The Register that if it is right, Qubole would be the access path rather than the holder of the data, and the files point to a concierge-services operator behind the brands. Qubole’s parent company, Idera, did not respond to inquiries from BleepingComputer or The Register, and the three financial firms declined to say which providers were compromised or whether Qubole was the access path.
For customers, the practical advice is unchanged: no card numbers have appeared in the published files, but the names, email addresses, phone numbers and booking details that have appeared are exactly the material used in convincing phishing messages. Unexpected messages claiming to come from a bank or card company should be checked through the company’s published contact details, not through links in the message itself.