Tigerfish Left Police Interviews Exposed Online

A transcription company used by police departments, prosecutors' offices, government departments and Silicon Valley technology firms left a large amount of sensitive customer data exposed on the open internet, including transcripts of police interviews and body-camera footage. The San Francisco-based firm, Tigerfish, has now secured the data after the lapse was reported to it, but it is not clear whether affected customers have been told.
The files sat on an Amazon-hosted cloud storage server that was openly listed and reachable through an easy-to-guess web address, with no password needed to open them. Alongside the police interview transcripts and body-camera footage, the exposed material included customers' raw audio and video footage and invoices from the company's clients, which include police departments and prosecutors' offices. No count of the exposed files has been disclosed.
How the exposure was found
The lapse was found in October by Anurag Sen, a security researcher who has spent a decade searching for sensitive datasets left exposed online. Sen alerted Tigerfish at the time but heard nothing back; the company later said his disclosure email had been caught in its spam filter. Sen then passed the details to TechCrunch, which verified the source of the leak and the data before contacting the company. Soon after that contact, Tigerfish closed off the storage bucket.
Tigerfish president Adam Goldberg told TechCrunch the company had blocked all public access to the bucket identified, including directory listings and individual files, and had verified that all of its other cloud storage buckets were blocked to public access. He added that the company was continuing to review and strengthen its storage security more broadly. Whether the company has notified its customers is unclear: Tigerfish did not respond to a follow-up email on the question.
Why this lapse matters
The material at stake is unusually sensitive. Transcripts of police interviews and body-camera footage are often tied to active criminal investigations, witness statements and other law-enforcement work, and the customer invoices reveal which agencies use the service. Because the data sat on a publicly listed server with no authentication at all, anyone who found the address could have viewed it, with no hacking skill required. It is not known how long the bucket was exposed, or whether anyone other than the researcher accessed it before it was secured.
Sen, who is 30 and works from Indonesia, has previously uncovered sensitive United States military emails spilling from a compartmentalised defence cloud server, databases exposing large volumes of customer records, and the inner workings of a national licence-plate surveillance system. He describes his work as an unpaid effort to warn organisations that their information is open to the internet. His point about this kind of failure is that it rarely comes down to shadowy hackers: many of the leaks he finds are basic human errors, such as an engineer spinning up a test cloud database, disabling authentication to test an interface, and forgetting to close it off before the weekend.
A familiar pattern with third-party vendors
The incident is also a reminder of how much sensitive work now sits with third-party suppliers. Police forces, prosecutors and technology companies hand recordings and documents to transcription firms precisely because the material is confidential, yet the security of that material depends on the vendor's own storage practices. Amazon has made it harder to make cloud storage buckets public without passing clear multi-step warnings, and newer development platforms have added similar safeguards, but misconfigured storage remains one of the most common ways sensitive data ends up on the open web. For Tigerfish's customers, the open questions now are whether their material was accessed, and when they will be told.