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Webworm spies on governments with stealthy VPN bridge

By The Daily Byte ·20 Nov 2026 ·3 min read
Network switches with blue and yellow Ethernet cables in a data centre

A China-aligned hacking group has rebuilt a legitimate open-source VPN tool into a stealthy bridge for spying on government networks, according to new research from Rapid7. The group, known as Webworm, took the SoftEther VPN Bridge and reworked it so thoroughly that only one antivirus vendor flagged the sample when researchers checked it.

Rapid7 published its analysis on 19 November. It attributes the tool to Webworm with moderate confidence, based on the configuration evidence and the group's previously reported behaviour. Webworm is known for targeting government organisations, particularly in Europe; security firm ESET documented the group targeting governments in Belgium, Italy, Serbia and Poland in 2025, and in May 2026 noted its shift away from custom-built malware towards dual-use tools such as SoftEther VPN.

A VPN rebuilt to hide

The modified tool is based on SoftEther VPN Bridge version 4.44, build 9807, but it has been rebuilt from source and rebranded throughout as NtMonitor VPN. The executable presents itself as netcapa.exe, a product called Network Monitor Software published by a company named Network Systems Solutions Inc. The disguise is inconsistent: the service name used by the entry point is still SEVPNBRIDGE, and many registry key paths still reference the SoftEther Project.

The stealth work goes deeper than the branding. The tool replaces SoftEther's recognisable web addresses with innocent-sounding ones, swapping /vpnsvc/vpn.cgi and /vpnsvc/connect.cgi for /update/alive.cgi and /update/picture.cgi. It also replaces the protocol's handshake watermark with a custom byte pattern, a truncated PNG image showing the Windows logo, so standard SoftEther clients and servers cannot complete a handshake with it and defenders cannot fingerprint it with the well-known stock marker.

Two more changes close off easy detection routes. The resource archive that SoftEther normally keeps beside its executables has been reduced to a bare minimum and packed inside the executable itself, making the file about 1.5 MB larger than the official build. And the configuration file, renamed from vpn_bridge.config to setting.conf, is encrypted with a custom cipher and marked with the magic bytes RCEN, where the standard software stores its settings in plain text.

Persistence, not payload

Rapid7 found no added command-execution backdoor in the sample. The tool's value to its operators is persistence: once a machine is compromised, the bridge links the victim's local network to the attacker's remote network, turning the infected host into an internal proxy and a route to other systems on the same network. The report does not establish how each host was first compromised, and it names no new victims.

The configurations Rapid7 examined all bridged a remote network into the local one. In cases that did not appear to be deliberate tests, the remote addresses sat inside AS 20473, belonging to The Constant Company, whose subsidiary Vultr has been associated with Webworm on many occasions. The public sample examined had been available since January, yet only one antivirus vendor detected it at the time of analysis.

Rapid7 has published indicators of compromise and a YARA ruleset, and recommends that defenders with TLS inspection look for POST requests to /update/picture.cgi claiming to carry a JPEG image whose body instead begins with PNG file bytes. The researchers warn that the branding, web addresses and watermark are the easiest parts for the group to change next, so government defenders should learn to recognise unauthorised SoftEther bridging itself rather than relying on any single marker.

Sources: Rapid7; CyberPress.