CVE-2026-133949: pip Trusts Compromised Certs

Python has warned users to upgrade pip after a critical flaw was assigned on 20 November 2026: older versions of the package installer still trust certificates from a compromised certificate authority, even on computers that have already been patched.
The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-133949, affects pip before version 26.2.2. The bundled copy of certifi shipped with those versions still contains the compromised eMudhra certificates, so an attacker in a position to intercept traffic could present a forged certificate and pip would accept it.
Why old pip still trusts the certificates
The problem is that pip does not rely only on the operating system's certificate store. According to Python, pip always loads certificates from its bundled copy of certifi in addition to the system store, and there is no supported way to turn that off.
That means updating the operating system alone does not fix it. Every pip version below 26.2.2 keeps trusting the compromised eMudhra certificates, even after the operating system removes them. Pointing pip at a different certificate bundle through the PIP_CERT setting or the --cert option does not help either: Python core developer Christian Heimes has said both options only add certificate authorities to the list and leave pip's bundled certifi in place.
Python's security announcement, sent on 20 November by Seth Larson and forwarded to the oss-security list, rates the vulnerability as critical severity. It says upgrading to a secure version of pip should be done either by first upgrading Python to a version that rejects the compromised intermediate certificates, or by using hash pinning with a known-secure version of pip. Pip is not vulnerable when it runs on a Python version that rejects the compromised certificates.
How the weak keys happened
The certificates at the centre of the flaw belong to eMudhra, an Indian certificate authority that sells certificates under the emSign brand. Eight of its intermediate certificate authorities had private keys so weak that anyone could recover them: all eight used elliptic curve cryptography with a private value below 256, and at least one had a value of 4, making the keys only three to eight bits long against a standard 384 bits.
On 17 October, a researcher whom Mozilla credits only as "Wayne" proved he controlled the keys by signing a message with each of them. Chrome and Firefox blocked the certificates within hours, eMudhra revoked all eight on 18 October, Sectigo revoked its cross-signed copies and Apple blocked the certificates on 19 October, and Microsoft blocked them on 20 October.
eMudhra traced the problem to a faulty certificate-generation script, which created weak key pairs alongside valid ones, and staff picked the weak keys for signing by mistake. The company said its infrastructure was not compromised and that no data was leaked. Google found no certificates issued from the eight authorities in Certificate Transparency logs, and eMudhra said it had issued no certificates to end users. There is no sign of abuse so far, but the keys are now public, so unpatched tools have no way to spot a forged certificate.
What to do now
According to Python, upgrading pip is the only reliable fix. Users should move to pip 26.2.2 or later and certifi 2026.10.19, which restores valid emSign roots after an earlier release removed them all. The same notice lists minimum versions of uv 0.13.4, sigstore 4.5.1 and pixi 0.82.1.
Because an old pip could itself be attacked during the upgrade, Python recommends installing the new pip wheel file directly using its published SHA-256 hash. The check must be repeated in every virtual environment, since each one keeps its own pip, and Docker images should be rebuilt without cache. Users of the python.org installer for macOS should upgrade both pip and certifi, because that installer ships its own copy of certifi.
The main risk is a man-in-the-middle attack: an attacker sitting between the user and the server, for example on public Wi-Fi or a compromised network, could intercept or alter traffic. In the worst case, a fake package index page could serve a package laced with malware, and pip would show no warning.