What Is Bill C-22? Canada's Lawful Access Bill

Bill C-22 is the Canadian government's proposed Lawful Access Act, a bill that would give police and intelligence agencies new powers to obtain information from phone companies, internet providers and other online services — and require some of those companies to build the technical ability to hand it over. It is one of the most contested pieces of legislation before Canada's Parliament, described by the government as a long-overdue modernisation and by privacy advocates as a major expansion of state surveillance. As of 21 November 2026, it is not law: it has passed the House of Commons and is being examined by a Senate committee.
The bill matters well beyond Canada because of what it would ask of the apps people use every day. Meta, which owns WhatsApp, has said it will not weaken encryption to comply with it. Signal has said it would rather leave Canada than build in access for the authorities. And senators have been warned that the same kind of intercept systems the bill would mandate were breached in the United States by hackers linked to China. This explainer sets out what Bill C-22 is, what each part would do, who supports it, who opposes it, and where it stands now.
What is Bill C-22?
Bill C-22, formally An Act respecting lawful access, was introduced in the House of Commons on 12 March 2026 by Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree. Its short title is the Lawful Access Act, 2026. It is a government bill in the first session of Canada's 45th Parliament.
The bill is the government's second attempt at this kind of law. In June 2025 it introduced a wide-ranging omnibus border and security bill, Bill C-2, which included lawful-access measures alongside many other changes. That bill was heavily criticised for threatening Charter-protected rights, and the government was eventually forced to shelve it. Bill C-22 is more limited in scope than its predecessor, focusing solely on lawful access, and it includes some modifications intended to answer earlier criticisms. But it also adds a new data-retention provision that was not in Bill C-2, which critics say raises significant additional privacy concerns.
The bill is divided into three parts. Part 1, called Timely Access to Data and Information, amends the Criminal Code and the law governing Canada's spy agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Part 2 creates an entirely new law, the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act. Part 3 requires a parliamentary review three years after the law takes full effect.
Part 1: faster access to subscriber information
Part 1 is the less controversial half of the bill, although critics still object to parts of it. It creates a new production order for subscriber information — the basic details a provider holds about an account holder — and a "confirmation of service" demand that police can issue to a telecommunications provider without going to a judge. It also amends search-warrant and computer-search provisions in the Criminal Code and makes related changes to the CSIS Act.
The government's argument is that investigators currently face delays obtaining basic subscriber details that can identify who was behind an account or a phone number, and that those delays can matter in fast-moving investigations. Critics respond that removing judicial oversight, even for basic information, lowers a safeguard that has traditionally applied before the state can compel a company to hand over personal data.
Part 2: the orders that worry critics most
Part 2 is where most of the debate is concentrated. It would let the Minister of Public Safety issue secret orders requiring "electronic service providers" to build or maintain capabilities that give police and intelligence agencies access to information. The definition of an electronic service provider is very broad. It covers not only telecom companies, social media platforms and cloud providers, but also AI tools and connected devices — and, as the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group has pointed out, could extend to online retailers, booking services, mental health professionals and financial institutions that make information available online.
Under the bill as passed by the House of Commons, ministerial orders would last for up to two years and would need approval from the federal Intelligence Commissioner. The government could also require designated core providers — likely large telecommunications and satellite companies — to keep categories of metadata, such as records of who contacted whom and when, for up to six months. The House of Commons cut that ceiling from one year to six months, and added a test requiring the minister to be satisfied that each category of metadata is essential.
The bill also says the government cannot require a provider to introduce a "systemic vulnerability" into its systems. The House amended the definition of that term so that it turns on a credible risk measured against recognised international technical standards, with a carve-out for flaws that would expose only a target's data. The amendments also added a clause dealing with decryption. Companies that breach the rules would face administrative penalties of up to $250,000 per violation, and individuals up to $50,000, with each day counting as a new violation.
The government says encryption is protected under the bill. Critics say the protection is not strong enough, because a system built to give the authorities access on demand creates a target for others to exploit, whatever the bill says about vulnerabilities.
Why the government says Canada needs it
The government's central argument is that Canada is behind its allies. Its position is that Canada is the only country in the G7 and the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing group without a modern lawful-access regime. It says the country still relies on a licence condition from 1995 that covers only voice telephony, and that help from other online services is entirely voluntary. In the government's view, that leaves investigators unable to obtain information they could lawfully obtain from a phone company in the past, simply because communications have moved to apps and online platforms.
Supporters of the bill also argue that the House of Commons amendments improved it: the retention ceiling was halved, orders were capped at two years, Intelligence Commissioner approval was added for orders, and the definition of a systemic vulnerability was tightened. From this perspective, the bill is a measured attempt to update the law for the way people actually communicate.
Why critics say it goes too far
Opponents dispute almost every part of that case. The International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group has called the legislation "one of the greatest threats to privacy in Canada of the past two decades", in the words of its national coordinator, Tim McSorley. In a joint letter dated 21 April 2026, dozens of civil society organisations and individuals called for the bill's full withdrawal, arguing that if adopted as written it would be "the most expansive invasion of Canadian privacy rights in modern history" and would put the cybersecurity of everyone in Canada at unacceptable risk.
Their objections fall into three groups. The first is scope: the bill could force almost any digital service to build surveillance capabilities, and the orders can be secret. The second is retention: the government could require companies to record and keep data about the location and digital interactions of people who are not suspected of anything. The third is security: building intercept-ready systems creates new points of failure.
For the security argument, critics point to the United States. In 2024, a China-linked hacking group known as Salt Typhoon compromised the wiretap systems that American telecom carriers use to fulfil requests under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, the 1994 US law requiring interception capability. The hackers reached call and text metadata belonging to more than a million users. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab have argued that this is the risk Part 2 would reproduce in Canada, and have cited testimony that the US National Security Agency found a security flaw in every interception-compliant switch it tested.
Canada's Privacy Commissioner, Philippe Dufresne, appeared before the Senate committee on 2 November 2026 to ask senators to amend the bill. And the companies that would have to comply have pushed back in public: Meta says it will not weaken encryption on WhatsApp or its other services; Signal has said it would rather leave Canada; and the networking company Tailscale says it would challenge the law in court.
Where the bill stands now
Bill C-22 passed the House of Commons on 18 June 2026, the same day it received first reading in the Senate. The Senate gave it second reading and sent it to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs on 22 October 2026. Parliament's LEGISinfo service lists its current status as "at consideration in committee in the Senate".
The committee has been hearing evidence through the autumn. On 16 November 2026 it held an evening panel with Meta, Signal and Tailscale — the companies that would have to build whatever the law demands. The bill is not law, and it has not received royal assent. Part 2 would come into force on a date set by the federal cabinet, rather than automatically.
What happens next
Three things are worth watching. First, whether the Senate committee amends the bill: the Privacy Commissioner has asked for changes, and senators have heard detailed criticism from civil liberties groups, academics and the tech industry. Second, whether the government accepts any Senate amendments when the bill returns to the House of Commons. And third, whether the companies' warnings harden into action — Signal leaving Canada, or a court challenge — if the bill passes in its current form.
Whatever happens, the debate is unlikely to end with this bill. The question it raises — how far the state can go in requiring private companies to build access into private communications — is being argued in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia as well. How Canada answers it will be watched by every company that offers end-to-end encryption, and by the users who rely on the same apps.